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Multinational Enterprise Regional Management Centres: Characteristics and Performance 
ABSTRACT 
In multinational enterprises (MNEs), regional management centres (RMCs) most frequently take the form 
of either dedicated regional headquarters (RHQs) or regional management mandates (RMMs) assigned to 
operating subsidiaries. We identify a series of critical differences in characteristics and performance 
between RHQs and RMMs, using a longitudinal sample of 855 Japanese RMCs across 41 countries. We 
also investigate parent-level differences between MNEs with distinct RMC configurations. We propose a 
structural complement to regional strategy extensions of the integration-responsiveness framework, and 
provide an important large sample baseline, aiding new theoretical and empirical research into MNE 
regional management strategy and structure.  
 
Keywords: MNE evolution; multinational enterprise; regional headquarters; regional management 
centres; theory of the MNE; regionalization 
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Multinational Enterprise Regional Management Centres: Characteristics and Performance 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that regionalization may better describe multinational enterprise (MNE) internationalization than 
global integration or multi-domesticity (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004), has led to renewed academic interest 
in regional strategies and structures, which can help balance global integration and local responsiveness 
(Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  Most of the research on regional management structures (e.g., Ambos & 
Schlegelmilch, 2010; Hoenen, Nell, & Ambos, 2014; Lunnan & Zhao, 2014) has focused on regional 
headquarters (RHQs). An RHQ is a special type of MNE foreign affiliate, tasked with the coordination, 
control, development and/or implementation of business strategies in a specific region (Enright, 2005a). 
The use of RHQs by MNEs leads to a three-tier nested structure (Hoenen & Kostova, 2014), with regular 
subsidiaries reporting to RHQs and RHQs reporting to corporate headquarters (HQ).  
In a number of MNEs, HQ functions may be regionally distributed to specialized administrative 
units (RHQs), and/or to operating subsidiaries which are mandated to allocate some time and resources to 
performing HQ functions (Alfoldi, Clegg, & McGaughey 2012; Piekkari, Nell, & Ghauri, 2010; Schütte, 
1997; Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016). Consistent with Alfoldi et al., (2012), we use the term Regional 
Management Mandates (RMMs) for the latter, and use the term Regional Management Centres (RMCs) 
to collectively describe RHQs and RMMs.  
There is evidence suggesting that a focus on RHQs has led to a neglect of research on other types 
of regional management units such as RMMs (Alfoldi et al., 2012). Apart from a few studies such as 
Laserre (1996), Enright et al., (2005a, b) and Alfoldi et al., (2012), there is very little research on the 
nature and characteristics of diverse units performing HQ functions at a regional level. Instead, most 
regional management research has focused on RHQ roles, evolution, and locations (e.g., Asakawa & 
Lehrer, 2003; Piekkari et al., 2010; Yeung, Poon, & Perry, 2001) Hence, there is a need to investigate 
regional structural elements beyond RHQs with regards to their relative prevalence, different 
characteristics, establishment logics, evolution, and simultaneous usage.  
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Additionally, literature suggests that of the few studies examining RMC characteristics, apart 
from exceptions such as Enright (2005a, b), large scale empirical studies are scarce (Alfoldi et al., 2012). 
An extensive search for RMC studies across the major international business and strategy literaturesi 
yielded only 30 papers, largely focused on RHQs (see Appendix I). Most of these studies are based on 
small sample sizes, restricted to one particular region, or are descriptive single-company case studies with 
limited generalizability.  
Hence, the extant literature lacks both scope and scale in regard to examining diversity within 
RMCs and characteristics of these diverse units. Accordingly, we develop a three-part research question 
to guide our exploratory investigation:  
1) How do RMCs (RMMs and RHQs) differ in their characteristics and performance?  
2) How do characteristics and performance differ between MNEs deploying different RMC 
configurations?  
3) How do characteristics of RMCs, and of MNEs with RMCs evolve over time? 
We aim to make two contributions. First, based on our findings, we provide a structural 
complement to Verbeke and Asmussen’s (2016) regional strategy extension of the integration-
responsiveness framework (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989); and develop four related propositions. Second, our 
results provide an important large sample baseline to inform subsequent theory building and empirical 
research into MNE regional management strategy and structure.  
 
Background 
Regional Management Rationale. Balancing conflicting demands for global integration and local 
responsiveness (Prahalad & Doz, 1987) remains an important challenge for MNEs. Regional management 
structures offer a feasible trade-off when operations within a region are large, complex, and different from 
other regions, providing opportunities for regional level scale economies and responsiveness (Egelhoff, 
1982; Verbeke & Asmussen, 2016). Stopford and Wells (1972) was one of the earliest contingency 
studies to associate MNE regional structures with strategy implementation. They discussed how MNEs 
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with a high percentage of foreign sales adopted regional (area) management structures, and how global 
product divisions were preferred when product diversity was high. Egelhoff (1988) tested the Stopford 
and Wells (1972) hypothesis. His results suggested that higher levels of foreign manufacturing rather than 
foreign sales led to regional management structures (due to co-ordination required for optimizing regional 
sourcing strategies). Using a sample of 95 German firms, Wolf & Egelhoff (2002) re-tested and found 
support for Egelhoff’s (1988) model, and extended it by considering strategy-structure fit for matrix 
structures. Their results suggested that a region-product matrix was more likely with high product 
diversity, and a region-functional matrix was more likely for higher levels of foreign manufacturing.  
Internalization scholars have pointed to regional strategies and structures being driven by the 
need to reduce “spatial transaction costs” which limit transferability, deployment, and exploitation of firm 
specific advantages (FSAs) outside of an MNE’s domestic market. These costs arise due to institutional, 
economic, cultural, geographic, and other differences between countries (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992; 
Ghemawat, 2003). MNEs do combine FSAs with host country specific advantages (CSAs) such as 
markets, resources, and regulations to address these challenges and strengthen competitive advantage 
(Johansson & Vahlne, 2009; Hennart, 2009). However, doing so at a regional rather than at a country 
level becomes optimal when intra-regional “spatial transaction costs” are much lower than those between 
regions. Further, the advantages of operating regionally are more pronounced for downstream value chain 
activities (e.g., sales, service, distribution and retail), which require commitments from key external 
stakeholders such as customers and partners (Rugman & Verbeke, 2005). Hence, Rugman & Verbeke 
(2008) extended the FSA/CSA framework with the concept of region-specific advantages requiring the 
presence of organizational structures supporting regional strategic decisions.  
 
Regional Management Centre Roles. Researchers have extended the dominant view that regional 
management centres only serve as geographic extensions of corporate headquarters for purposes of 
regional coordination, control, governance, and information processing. For instance, Lasserre (1996), in 
a survey-based study on European MNEs in Asia, investigated the entrepreneurial and regional 
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integration roles of RHQs. He identified a series of region-specific mandates that RHQs carry out at 
different stages during MNE internationalization processes. In a study of European RHQs, Hoenen, et al., 
(2014) discussed how RHQs, by being embedded across local, regional, and global markets, can help 
build MNE entrepreneurial capabilities. Asakawa & Lehrer (2003) explained how certain RHQs 
transform local innovation into global strategic assets by identifying and nurturing local R&D activity to 
develop knowledge, followed by dissemination of knowledge assets across the MNE network. Verbeke 
and Asmussen (2016) suggested that regional head office structures may be vital to identifying, 
absorbing, and disseminating new globally applicable knowledge from host-regions. They also 
emphasized the importance of RMCs in orchestrating regional value chains to exploit cross border 
resource and market differences, while achieving scale efficiencies. 
Several studies describe how RMC roles may evolve over time. Based on a study of RHQs in 
Asia Pacific, Lasserre (1996) suggested that RHQs start off with an entrepreneurial orientation, serving as 
a base to seek opportunities, initiating new regional ventures, and helping subsidiaries to develop strategy.  
As the MNE becomes better established in the region and subsidiaries mature, RHQs take on coordinating 
and integrative functions, until they wind down almost completely or move into purely administrative 
roles. Ambos, Schlegelmilch, Ambos, and Brenner (2009) discussed how mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) outside of the home region may lead to regional management structures evolving over time. In a 
case study of an M&A in the banking sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), they found that post 
acquisition, the head office of the acquired bank was initially assigned a regional governance and 
standardisation role, which did not align well with its actual capabilities. Over time, driven by the need 
for legitimacy and influence, the unit strengthened its distinctive capabilities and transformed its role into 
a regional center of excellence in banking practices.  Based on a longitudinal case study in a European 
MNE, Piekkari et al., (2010) suggested that matching regional management capabilities with information 
processing requirements is a complex process of evolution and adaptation. The MNE regional 
management system evolved at unit, regional, and corporate levels to address the need for internal, and 
external complexities at various levels, and inter-region differentiation.   
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Regional Management Centre Configurations. Research has noted the presence of regional 
management structures distinct from dedicated RHQs. Enright (2005a, b) distinguished between regional 
offices and RHQs. Regional offices carry out coordination and supporting roles on behalf of MNE HQs 
but have no all-encompassing hierarchical authority over other subsidiaries in the same region. RHQs, in 
contrast, have more extensive mandates including full hierarchical control, which often involves the 
financial consolidation of all regional activities for the focal MNE (Enright, 2005a). Lasserre (1996) 
found that some companies mandate operating subsidiaries with regional management roles to avoid an 
extra layer of management bureaucracy and keep costs down. Along similar lines, Schütte (1997) 
discussed the concept of “virtual RHQs” wherein a dedicated RHQ does not exist, rather the 
responsibilities of a dedicated RHQ are distributed to existing subsidiaries through their 
directors/managers. Using a case study of Unilever across three Central European countries, Alfoldi et al., 
(2012) argued why operating subsidiaries with regional mandates (RMMs) should be treated as 
conceptually different from dedicated RHQs. They posited that while RMMs in smaller, peripheral 
markets offer cost, responsiveness, and information processing advantages (relative to more 
administratively focused RHQs with dedicated leadership and support staff), they may raise legitimacy 
concerns. Verbeke & Asmussen (2016) noted that compared to dedicated RHQs, RMMs may prioritize 
operations in the country where they are located, at the expense of other countries in the region. For all 
these reasons, we expect materially different characteristics between RMMs and RHQs, as well as 
between MNEs which adopt different regional management configurations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into a sample and analysis section, followed by the 
presentation of results, discussion, and conclusion. Due to the exploratory nature of our study, we do not 
include a hypotheses development section, and provide explanations, theoretical propositions, and a 
preliminary conceptual model in the discussion section. 
  8 
SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS 
Data 
We utilized the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Japanese Overseas Investments) dataset (Toyo Keizai, 
2010) as the primary data source. This dataset is updated annually and consists of panel data about foreign 
subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs. Our dataset includes almost the entire population of overseas affiliates of 
all publicly listed and non-listed Japanese companies during the time period from 1990 to 2009. We 
combined the Toyo Keizai dataset with the Nikkei Economic Electronic Database System published by 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun to add parent firm-level information. Sachwald (1995) concluded that the Toyo 
Keizai database is the most extensive and reliable longitudinal source for information on Japanese MNEs 
available today. Another advantage of using this dataset is that Japanese MNEs have a long 
internationalization history and that Japanese MNEs can be found in more than 150 different countries 
globally with extensive and consistent information available (Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004). 
Sample selection and data integrity. The functional activities that affect an MNE’s competitive 
advantage differ between small and large subsidiaries (e.g. Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Anand & Delios, 
1997; Hennart, 1991). We were interested in those RHQs and RMMs that have regional and operational 
mandates beyond just a representative office or sales office status and are therefore larger in size. We 
performed a series of robustness tests at different levels of RMC employee size to determine the validity 
of this criterion. We examined the sample distribution in terms of the number of employees at the foreign 
affiliate level, as suggested by Delios and Beamish (1999). The histogram of the natural logarithmii 
revealed two clustered distributions which converged at the count of nine employees. Second, we tested 
how RMC mandates changed at different cut-off points. The results confirmed that small foreign affiliates 
have strategic mandates less frequently than larger affiliates. Therefore, those foreign affiliates with fewer 
than nine employees were excluded from the sample. Affiliates with a Toyo Keizai industry sector code 
of “Regional Headquarters” were identified as RHQs; and non-RHQ affiliates with a venture creation 
objective of “Strengthening Regional Headquarters Function” were identified as RMMs. We excluded 
Regional Holding Companies from the sample since these are entities set-up for tax and jurisdictional 
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purposes rather than for providing regional leadership. The final sample contains 855 unique RMCs 
(6,331 RMC-year cases) comprising 568 RMMs (4,567 RMM-year cases) and 311 RHQs (1,764 RHQ-
year cases). The unique RMM and RHQ numbers do not add up to 855 since 24 RMCs function as 
RMMs and RHQs at different points in time. These RMCs are deployed by 455 unique MNEs across 41 
countries and 12,537 subsidiaries. Table 1 summarizes the RMC sample profile. 
________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________ 
Missing data. We performed full information maximum likelihood (FIML) to address missing 
data for several variables and overcome potential sample bias due to incomplete data.  Both FIML and 
multiple imputation methods yield robust standard errors and reduce errors in parameter estimates. 
However, unlike multiple imputation, FIML does not insert missing data. Instead, it corrects regression 
parameter estimates based on correlations across all variables in the model. FIML is deemed to be a 
superior alternative to multiple imputation since it is deterministic, takes into consideration every variable 
in the analysis model, is more efficient, and involves less uncertainty (Allison, 2012).  
At an overall level, the sample has 27% missing data. The amount of missing data varies by 
variable, ranging from 0% to 70% across variables of interest. We performed FIML regressions for the 
following dependent variables (missing percentages shown in brackets): RMC performance (68%), R&D 
intensity (70%), advertising intensity (70%), and degree of internationalization (56%). We did not 
perform FIML regressions for the following dependent variables (missing percentages shown in 
brackets): RMC revenue (30%), RMC assets (30%), RMC employees (30%), MNE ROA (28%) and 
MNE ROS (28%), since variables with which they were strongly correlated were also simultaneously 
missing. We also did not perform FIML regressions for several other variables which had less than 5% 
missing data. 
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Analysis 
To explore potential differences between RHQs and RMMs, one-way multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) tests were performed for continuous scale variables. Since the distributions of certain 
variables were skewed with long tails to the right, we used log transformations.iii MANOVA is commonly 
used to examine differences in sample characteristics across categories (e.g. Egelhoff, 1982; Peng, Tan & 
Tong, 2004). For example, Peng et al. (2004) used MANOVA to identify significant differences in 
characteristics across four types of strategic groups based on ownership types. Other studies have used 
analysis of variance as a tool for similar tests (Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Osborne, Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 
2001; Peng & Luo, 2000; Short, Ketchen, Palmer & Hult, 2007).  
For nominal variables, such as investment purpose, ownership modes, industries, and subsidiary 
locations, chi-square tests were performed using crosstabs (contingency tables). A modified Bonferroni 
procedure was employed in the follow-up tests for both MANOVA and chi-square statistics to apply a 
more stringent standard to the significance levels of p-values (Jaccard & Wan, 1996). This corrected and 
controlled for Type 1 error inflation caused by multiple analyses of variance.  
For certain dependent variables with missing values, we performed FIML OLS regressions for 
continuous variables and FIML logistic regressions for nominal variables. All statistical analyses in this 
study were performed as two-tailed tests (Leventhal & Huynh, 1996). In addition to p-values, we report 
95% confidence intervals for all variables and the Cohen’s “d” as an effect size measure for all 
continuous variables (Cohen, 1988; 1992). Where the analysis involves logistic regression, we compute 
and report an equivalent Cohen’s d value by dividing the odds ratio by 1.81 (Chinn, 2000). 
In the next section, we report the results. For readability purposes, we do not elaborate the 
specific differences in characteristics in detail here, as they are listed in Tables 1 to 11 and discussed in 
the subsequent section. However, for convenience, we summarize the specific characteristics and 
performance differences in Table 12.  
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RESULTS 
Affiliate level sample profile 
RHQs and RMMs. Table 1 shows that from 1990 to 2009, Japanese MNE RMMs registered a 
five-fold increase, while RHQs tripled over the same time period. On average, there are over twice as 
many RMMs as RHQs (the annual average ratio is 2.6).   The ratio has fluctuated between a low of 1.8 (in 
1990) to a high of 3.4 (in 1995) and has increased steadily from 2.2 in 2004 to 3.1 in 2009. See Figure 1.  
Regions. Table 2 indicates that in the triad region, Asia exhibits the largest growth in Japanese 
RMC numbers with about an eight-fold increase from 1990 to 2009. In Europe (EU) and North America 
(NA), RMCs have increased about three times over the same time period. In contrast to a pattern of 
growth followed by decline in EU and NA, Japanese MNE regular subsidiary numbers in Asia have 
grown steadily and more than doubled. However, the percentage of RMCs to subsidiaries has steadily 
increased over time in EU and NA and was around 7% in both regions in 2009, significantly exceeding 
the RMC proportion in Asia (about 3%). See Figures 2 and 3. 
______________________________ 
INSERT FIGURES 1-3 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________ 
 
  Developed and developing economies. Table 3 depicts a proportional distribution over time of 
RHQs, RMMs, and regular subsidiaries between developed and developing countries. We note that in 
developed countries, RHQ, RMM, and regular subsidiary proportions have all reduced over time. 
However, the RHQ and RMM proportions in 2009 (62% and 74%) are considerably higher than for 
regular subsidiaries (41%). In contrast, these proportions have all increased over time in developing 
countries. However, the RHQ and RMM proportions in 2009 (38% and 24%) are considerably lower than 
for regular subsidiaries (59%). For nine out of the ten developed/developing countries, RHQ and RMM 
proportions are significantly higher/lower than the corresponding subsidiary proportions in 2009.  
______________________________ 
INSERT TABLES 1-3 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________ 
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Foreign affiliate (RHQ, RMM) characteristics 
Investment purposes. Results suggest (Table 4) that RMMs have a significantly greater focus on 
market, resource, and efficiency seeking motivations (as a proportion of total) relative to RHQs. For 
instance, RMMs are twice as likely as RHQs to have set up production and distribution networks as an 
investment purpose. With regards to strategic purposes, RMMs have a substantially higher focus on 
innovation management and a higher proportion of information processing and knowledge seeking 
purposes. RHQs have a significantly greater focus on financial risk management.  We also examined the 
nature of these differences per time period of affiliate establishment (pre-1980, 1980-89, 1990-99, and 
2000-onwards).  The differences in relative proportion of most investment purposes between RHQs and 
RMMs are consistent and significant over time except for strategic purposes. The significantly greater 
overall proportion of innovation management for RMMs arises from two periods during which R&D 
purposes proportions were very low for RHQs (0% pre-1980 and 4% from the year 2000 onwards). The 
significantly greater overall RMM proportion of information and knowledge seeking purposes is largely 
due to RMM proportions (61%) being more than twice as great as RHQ proportions (28%) during the 
1980-89 timeframe. 
Dominant industries. Results in Table 5 show that RMMs and regular subsidiary proportions 
significantly differ across eight out of nine industry sectors (we do not examine RHQs in this context 
since they are not classified by industry sector). In particular, there is a substantially lower proportion of 
RMMs to conventional subsidiaries in manufacturing relative to wholesale, transportation, and retail. 
Over the period of 1990 to 2009, RMM proportions have increased relative to regular subsidiary 
proportions in the manufacturing and wholesale sectors. 
Revenues, employees and start dates. Table 6 shows that RMMs and RHQs significantly differ 
across the dimensions of revenue and number of employees. These results hold for the overall sample and 
across each of the four time periods (1990-94; 1995-99, 2000-04, and 2005-09). RHQs have consistently 
higher revenues (about 1.5 times higher), but significantly lower employees (about half as much) 
compared to RMMs. Furthermore, the relative proportions of RMM and RHQ start dates differ 
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significantly for each time period. In relative terms, the highest proportion of RMMs were established in 
the pre-1980 and 1980-99 periods, while the highest proportions of RHQ establishment occurred in the 
following two time periods (1990-99 and 2000-onwards).  
Ownership and control. Table 7 indicates that on average, RHQs have significantly lower 
numbers of total parents, and Japanese parents than RMMs.  However, RHQs have significantly higher 
levels of primary parent equity ownership and greater numbers and proportions of expatriate employees, 
relative to RMMs. RHQs are also more likely to be wholly-owned relative to RMMs. Two substantial 
trends over time are first that primary parent equity ownership for RMMs has increased from an average 
of 83% in 1990-94 to 91% in 2005-2009; and second that for these time periods, the percentage of 
expatriates to total employees has decreased for both RHQs and RMMs from 32% to 23% and from 16% 
to 10% respectively. See Figure 4. 
______________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________ 
 
RHQ and RMM performance 
Logistic regression results (Table 8) show that relative to RMMs, RHQs have a significantly higher 
probability of breaking even and a significantly lower probability of unprofitable performance. RHQs and 
RMMs do not significantly differ in regard to probability of profitable performance. 
________________________________ 
INSERT TABLES 4-8 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________ 
Parent level sample profile 
Table 1 also breaks down our sample of 455 Japanese MNEs with RMCs into three MNE types. 
The majority comprises 337 MNEs with RMMs only (64%). 140 MNEs operate with RHQs only (27%) 
and the 45 MNEs which have both RHQs and RMMs (dual model) constitute the minority at 9%. The 
totals of the MNE types (522) are greater than 455 since 67 MNEs have over time adopted more than one 
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RMC configuration. Figure 5 plots the number of MNEs corresponding to each RMC configuration from 
1990 to 2009. The table and plot indicate that increase in RMCs since 2000 has been driven largely by 
growth in MNEs with RMMs only. Such MNEs have nearly quadrupled from 39 to 167 between 1990 
and 2009, while MNEs with RHQs and dual model MNEs have only doubled and grown by 1.7 times 
respectively. Figure 6 depicts the time trend for the number of RMCs per MNE for each MNE type. The 
ratio of RMCs to MNEs has remained fairly steady at around 1.5 RMCs per MNE for MNEs with RMMs 
only as well as MNEs with RHQs. However, the corresponding ratio for dual model MNEs has nearly 
doubled from about 2 RMCs per MNE in 1990 to about 4 in 2009. In particular, the RMC to MNE ratio 
for the dual model shows accelerated growth for the timeframe 2005-2009.  
________________________________ 
INSERT FIGURES 5-6 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________ 
 
RMC parent characteristics 
Table 9 shows that for the overall sample, MNEs with only RHQs have the highest levels of employees, 
revenues, total assets, and percentage of foreign sales, followed by MNEs with both RHQs and RMMs, 
followed by MNEs with RMMs only. However, R&D intensity (percentage of R&D expenditure to 
revenue) is significantly greater for MNEs with RHQs and RMMs, relative to MNEs with RHQs only. 
MNEs with RHQs only and MNEs with RHQs and RMMs also have significantly greater advertising 
intensities relative to MNEs with RMM’s only. However, the difference between the first two MNE types 
are not significant.  
We also compared employees, total assets, and revenues for the three MNE types over four time 
periods and found that during the initial period of our sample (1990-94), MNEs with both RHQs and 
RMMs had the highest levels of tangible assets. During 1995-99, firms with RHQs only had significantly 
more assets and revenues than firms with both RHQs and RMMs. Over the most recent time periods 
2000-04 and 2004-09, firms with RHQs only had significantly higher tangible assets across all categories.  
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We examined whether older MNEs were more likely to adopt a traditional RHQ only model, while newer 
MNEs adopt an RMM only model. We measured “international age” as the time period in years from an 
MNE’s first foreign subsidiary establishment to the last year of observation. The average international age 
for MNEs with RHQs only is 44.2 years, while that of MNEs with RMMs only is 30.4 years. A t-test of 
means indicates the difference is significant, suggesting that all else being equal, older/newer MNEs are 
more likely to adopt an RHQ only/RMM only model.  
 
RMC parent performance 
Since MNE performance can vary considerably by industry sector, we examined two sub-samples for 
manufacturing parents and wholesale parents, which together constitute over 93% of the MNEs with 
RMCs in our sample. Table 10 shows that within manufacturing, MNEs with only RHQs have 
significantly better performance in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) relative to 
the other MNE types. MNEs with both RHQs and RMMs perform significantly better than MNEs with 
only RMMs. These differences increase over time, i.e., they are substantially higher over the periods 
2000-04 and 2005-09 relative to 1990-94 and 1995-99.   
Within the wholesale sector, this pattern is reversed (see Table 11) i.e., MNEs with only RMMs 
have significantly better performance than MNEs with both RHQs and RMMs, which have performed 
better than those MNEs with only RHQs. These differences are also substantially higher for the later time 
periods of 2000-04 and 2005-09. 
 
Regional structure evolution 
At an affiliate level, twenty-four RMCs in our sample are classified as RHQs and RMMs at different 
points in time. Of these, thirteen were initially RMMs and later transformed to RHQs, while eleven were 
RHQs to begin with. At the parent level, we find sixty-seven MNEs with RMCs changed their regional 
management model over time. Twenty-two of them shifted between RMM only to RHQ only models (11 
each). Twenty-three used an RHQ only model as well as the dual model (RMMs and RHQs), with the 
majority of these (17) initially establishing RHQ only configurations. Thirty-two MNEs adopted an RMM 
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only as well as a dual model at different points in time, with most of them (25) shifting from an RMM 
only model to the dual model. 
Overall, the empirical results demonstrate that (a) Japanese MNE deployment of RMCs varies 
considerably by region and country; (b) at the foreign affiliate level, RHQs and RMMs differ significantly 
in terms of characteristics and performance;  (c) the three types of MNEs which use RMCs as part of their 
governance structure (those with both RHQs and RMMs, those with only RHQs, and those with only 
RMMs) differ significantly from each other in regard to characteristics and performance; and (d) there are 
some notable trends over time concerning RMC establishment, characteristics and performance at the 
affiliate and parent levels. Table 12 summarizes the findings.  
________________________________ 






This study investigates whether and how RMCs (RHQs and RMMs) differ from each other at the affiliate 
level, whether and how MNEs that use diverse RMC configurations differ from each other, and how these 
differences evolve over time. The results of our investigation show that several important differences 
exist at both the sub-unit and the parent firm level. Based on our findings, we inform the classic 
integration-responsiveness (I-R) framework (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), by specifying regional structural 
components, which complement the regional strategy dimension introduced by Verbeke & Asmussen 
(2016). While Table 12 summarizes the findings, in this section, we explain some of our key findings in 
depth, develop corresponding propositions, and provide a preliminary conceptual model (Figure 8). We 
also provide brief explanations for several other findings. 
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Theoretical contributions 
The original I-R framework draws upon the strategy-structure-performance (SSP) sub-stream of 
contingency theory (Chandler, 1966; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Rumelt, 1974), which suggests that 
optimal outcomes are determined by the fit between a firm’s external environment, its strategy, and its 
organizational approach. The I-R framework provides a two-dimensional depiction of an MNE’s 
environment – pressures for achieving global integration on one hand (to realize cost efficiencies and 
maintain consistency through scale, standardization, and control); and pressures for achieving local 
responsiveness on the other (to tailor products to country differences such as customer preferences, 
regulations, and institutions). When integration and responsiveness pressures are high and low 
respectively, a standardized “global” approach to products, and processes with centralized decision 
making is recommended. When integration pressures are low and responsiveness pressures are high, a 
“multi-domestic” approach with autonomy delegated to country subsidiaries is recommended.  
However, as Verbeke and Asmussen (2016) point out, it is less clear what MNEs should do when 
both pressures are high i.e., what is an optimal “transnational” approach, since for instance, “a product 
cannot be simultaneously standardized and locally adapted” (p.14). Hence the authors introduced into the 
framework a regional strategy dimension which maintains consistency within a region, while adapting to 
inter-regional differences. This approach provides regional economies of scale as well as regional 
responsiveness when regions are sufficiently large and internally homogeneous markets but differ 
substantially from each other, and may therefore represent a feasible response to a transnational 
environment. By incorporating the regional dimension into the I-R framework, Verbeke and Asmussen 
(2016) extend the possible strategic responses from three to six Blocks (1. global, 2. multi-domestic, 3. 
transnational, 4. global or regional, 5. regional and 6. multi-domestic or regional) as shown in Figure 7.  
Our findings provide a structural complement to the above regional strategy extension of the I-R 
framework. RHQs have been proposed as a structural model for transnational strategy (e.g., Paik & Sohn, 
2004), while RMMs have been proposed as a cost-efficient model for “new, peripheral, or transitional 
markets” (Alfoldi et al., 2012). Such suggestions, which are based on case-studies may have very limited 
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generalizability – for instance, we find evidence that in large, developed markets such as North America 
and Europe, most wholesale Japanese MNEs use RMMs. Our investigation of RHQs and RMMs’ 
proportions and performance by industry sector enables a finer grained theoretical mapping of structure to 
regional strategy. We find a higher proportion of RMMs (to regular subsidiaries) in downstream value 
chain industries such as wholesale, retail, and transportation; and a lower proportion in manufacturing. 
Our analysis suggests that in the wholesale sector, MNEs with an RMM-only model perform best, 
followed by those with a dual model (RHQs and RMMs), followed by MNEs with RHQs only. For 
manufacturing, the pattern is reversed and MNEs with an RHQ-only model are the best performers.  
RHQs are often focused on identifying synergies and implementing scale efficiencies through 
centralized support functions and administration, with weak links to primary value chain activities in 
subsidiaries (Paik & Sohn, 2004; Ghemawat, 2005; Alfoldi et al., 2012).  Our finding that RHQs are 
established far more frequently for financial risk mitigation relative to RMMs (23% to 8%) underscores 
this point. This is particularly salient for Japanese MNEs, which have traditionally operated in a largely 
centralized manner (e.g., R&D in subsidiaries coordinated with HQ through expatriate engineers), with 
most RHQs functioning as administrative units with little autonomy (Lehrer & Asakawa, 1999; 
Edgington & Hayter, 2012). Consequently, we find far fewer RHQs established for R&D purposes 
relative to RMMs (11% to 18%).  
RMMs being large operating subsidiaries are likely to possess strong technical and operational 
capabilities, and more likely to be embedded in regional business, information, and relationship networks. 
Johanson & Vahlne (2009) theorized that knowledge and business relationships derived from industry-
specific experience, and being embedded in business networks of customers, suppliers, and partners may 
be critical to MNE success. In the regional context, such experience may be particularly important for 
several MNEs, since their customer-partner-supplier network may have a greater degree of intra-region 
(relative to inter-region) consistency. We do find a substantially higher proportion of RMMs motivated by 
the need to follow customers and partners into new markets relative to RHQs (14% to 4%). Hence, 
RMMs are likely to respond better to changing requirements of regional market situations than RHQs.  
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From an information processing standpoint (Piekkari et al., 2010), the wholesale MNE business 
model, (and particularly Japanese MNE wholesale) relies on a high degree of flexible, low cost, and quick 
responses in cross-border information processing, which may be best served by a regional RMM 
governance model. Japanese MNE wholesalers have extremely diversified business lines (Larke & 
Davies, 2007) with firms such as Itochu, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Tomen trading in numerous global 
markets across a broad spectrum of products. Such companies rely on extensive albeit low cost, 
responsive, and tactical information processing networks to respond to and translate into business 
opportunities the regulatory, economic, social, and technological changes in international markets 
(Dziubla, 1982; UNCTAD, 2005). Hence for wholesale MNEs, RMMs (rather than RHQs) may be more 
effective for improving cost and speed of regional information processing because they provide more 
localized resources at a lower cost (Alfoldi et al., 2012), and are likely to be better connected to regional 
business and information networks. We find RMMs are established more frequently for information 
processing and knowledge seeking purposes relative to RHQs (56% to 47%); and pertinently, a greater 
proportion of wholesale RMMs are focused on information-sharing and knowledge-seeking (61%) 
relative to manufacturing RMMs (41%). From an internalization perspective, wholesale is a downstream 
value chain sector, with location-bound FSAs that may benefit from cross-border knowledge sharing, 
regional coordination, and resource recombinations across operating functions (Verbeke & Kano, 2016).  
Hence, as our performance findings reveal, wholesale MNEs may be best served by a regionally 
responsive RMM model. We posit this to be generally applicable for MNEs in Block 6, where pressures 
for regional responsiveness in the context of a regional strategy are relatively higher. In contrast, an 
upstream value chain sector (e.g., manufacturing), with a high degree of non-location bound FSAs, may 
benefit from a more globally integrated and efficient model, which as our performance findings suggest is 
best served by an RHQ model. We posit this to be generally applicable for MNEs in Block 4 where 
pressures for global integration in the context of a regional strategy are relatively higher. For MNEs with 
transnational strategies (Block 3), we argue that a dual model governance structure comprising RHQs to 
facilitate integration and efficiency and RMMs to enable better operational responsiveness is ideal. In 
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Block 5, which corresponds to moderate levels of integration and responsiveness pressures, we contend 
that either an RHQ or an RMM based model may be appropriate. (See Figure 7). 
Proposition 1: In the context of regional strategy, MNEs emphasizing global integration are likely to 
implement and benefit from an RHQ-only model; MNEs focused on regional responsiveness are likely to 
implement and benefit from an RMM-only model; transnational organizations are likely to implement a 
dual model; and either an RHQ-only or an RMM-only model is likely to serve well the needs of MNEs 
facing moderate levels of integration and responsiveness pressures. 
Proposition 2: Downstream value chain sectors (e.g., wholesale, retail) benefit from RMM governance 
models which favour regional responsiveness; while upstream value chain sectors (e.g., manufacturing) 
benefit from RHQ governance models which favour global integration. 
Proposition 3: MNEs for whom leveraging regional business and relationship networks is vital to 
success, are more likely to segregate regional administrative functions from co-ordination of primary 
value chain activities and rely on governance models which include RMMs (RMM only or RHQ+RMM). 
Our findings may also explain some variation in regional governance structures from the above 
propositions. We find a higher proportion of RHQs relative to subsidiaries and RMMs within the EU and 
NA, and a lower proportion in Asia. Such relative focus on developed regions and locations may reflect 
institutional and resource-based characteristics which facilitate RMC investment. Ease of doing business, 
availability of capable personnel, stronger institutional environments (Yeung et al., 2001; Zhou, 2015), as 
well as expatriate preferences for locations with high living standards (Schotter & Beamish, 2013) may be 
key drivers of RMC location choices.  For instance, Zhou (2015) found that within an MNE, units in 
stronger institutional environments are more likely to regionally supervise subsidiaries located in 
countries with weak institutions. Further, these proportions may be driven by a path-dependent 
international expansion process (Penrose, 1959), which leverages and adapts existing resources and FSAs 
while seeking new opportunities (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Until 1995, the vast majority of Japanese FDI 
and RHQs were concentrated within the EU and NA. We note (Table 2 and Figure 2) the marked increase 
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in Asia RMC numbers commencing in 1995 – which is consistent with the start of a long decline in 
Japan’s economy. Many Japanese MNEs came under pressure to reduce costs by moving production 
bases to developing nations, especially China (Makino et al., 2004). This operational shift necessitated 
greater coordination and control regarding Asian operations. However, despite shifting investment trends 
towards Asia, rather than establishing additional Asian RHQs, several MNEs with a long history of 
internationalization could use existing RHQs or a combination of existing RHQs and new RMMs to 
manage growth in emerging markets.   
We also find that the oldest and largest MNEs with the most tangible assets, and the highest 
percentages of foreign sales tend to establish RHQs only, with smaller firms establishing RMMs only, 
and with intermediate firms being most likely to adopt a dual (RHQ+RMM) regional governance model. 
This is also consistent with our prior finding regarding older MNEs adopting an RHQ only model, since 
older MNEs are more likely to have higher levels of employees, revenues, and assets. Dedicated RHQs 
are high cost solutions, and require scale efficiencies to be viable, compared to assigning additional 
regional (RMM) responsibility to a regular subsidiary (Alfoldi et al., 2012). Hence larger MNEs are more 
likely to have an RHQ only or a dual regional governance model. Finally, a number of smaller MNEs 
may manage home region operations from corporate HQ (CHQ). For instance, several Japanese MNEs 
use their CHQ in Japan to manage expansion in Asia, rather than establish dedicated RHQs. Such MNEs 
are therefore more likely to designate large subsidiaries as RMMs. 
For the above reasons, regional strategy-structure considerations notwithstanding, MNEs may 
leverage a combination of existing RHQs and CHQ with or without RMMs to manage expansion into 
new countries/regions or within their home region. 
Proposition 4: MNEs with a long history of internationalization, and larger MNEs (assets, revenues, 
employees, percentage foreign sales, and footprint extending beyond their home region), are likely to 
implement an RHQ-only or a dual (RHQ+RMM) model.  
Figure 8 depicts a preliminary conceptual framework based on the four propositions developed. 
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Explanations of other findings 
Affiliate-level characteristics. We find that RHQs generate relatively more revenue than RMMs 
(about 1.5 times as much), but have about half the number of employees. This indicates that most RHQs 
consolidate financials across subsidiaries in the region and underscores that in addition to their regional 
mandates, RMMs are large operating subsidiaries. RHQs and RMMs do not significantly differ in their 
proportions of profitable performance (about 63% each). However, RHQs are about 1.6 times more likely 
to break-even (from the odds ratio), but about 1.5 times less likely to be unprofitable relative to RMMs. 
Hence, RHQs are on average less risky than RMMs, and the data suggest that diversification of risk based 
on RHQ financial consolidation mandates at the regional level is the main reason.  
We find RHQs show greater average equity ownership levels than RMMs (96% vs. 87%) and are 
also more likely to be wholly owned (94% vs. 76%). While RMMs do share the control and 
standardization mandate with RHQs, they are also driven by the need to exploit local knowledge, and 
hence form equity ventures with local partners, to operate successfully in the domestic market. The RMM 
focal parent equity ownership increase over time (83% in 1990-94 to 91% in 2005-09) may also be driven 
by a need to compensate for the decline in expatriate percentage (about 100% between 1990 to 2009), 
since expatriates represent an important coordination and control mechanism for MNEs. With RHQs, 
equity ownership has remained very high at about 96% through 1990-2009.  
The decline in absolute number of expatriates and expatriate percentage over time for both RHQs 
and RMMs (about 60% between 1990 to 2009) is consistent with prior empirical research on Japanese 
subsidiaries. Beamish and Inkpen (1998) provide two explanations. First, Japanese MNEs had to hire 
locals because of a limited supply of expatriate managers, and second, Japanese MNEs are recognizing 
the benefits of empowering local management and competing in a truly global manner. 
Parents with RMCs: numbers and growth. Our sample includes 455 MNEs which deploy 855 
RMCs across 12,537 subsidiaries, resulting in an average of about two RMCs per MNE and 14 regular 
subsidiaries per RMC. MNEs which deploy both RMMs and RHQs (dual model) have greater numbers of 
RMCs per MNE (average of over 3) relative to MNEs which deploy either RMMs or RHQs (average of 
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1.5 for both). The much greater ratio for MNEs with the dual model is partly driven by substantial 
fluctuation in MNE and corresponding RMC numbers during the period 2005-2009. In this timeframe, the 
dual model MNE numbers dropped by about 10% while their RMM numbers rose by 70% and RHQ 
numbers declined by 15%. This suggests several Japanese MNEs may have in response to the Global 
Financial Crisis (2007-2009), increased their adoption of lower cost RMM models, driven by the need to 






With this study, we respond to calls for more research on MNE HQ disaggregation and specifically on the 
RMC phenomenon (e.g. Alfoldi et al., 2012; Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2010; Baaij & Slangen, 2013; 
Cantwell, 2009; Lunnan & Zhao, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large sample study 
to offer a detailed overview of specific characteristics and performance differences between RHQs and 
RMMs based on a longitudinal global dataset. Given the exploratory nature of our study, we theorize ex-
post, proposing a structural complement to Verbeke & Asmussen’s (2016) regional strategy extension of 
the I-R framework, and developing four propositions on the relationship between MNE characteristics, 
regional strategy, regional structure, and performance.  
We find that RMMs and RHQs exhibit substantially different characteristics with regard to 
venture creation logics, levels of employees, revenues, industry sector of operation, ownership and 
control modes, and performance. We also find that several characteristics (e.g., strategic establishment 
purposes, focal MNE equity ownership) evolve over time. At the MNE level, we find three modes of 
regional governance – MNEs with RMMs (majority), MNEs with RHQs, and MNEs with both RMMs 
and RHQs (minority). These three MNE types differ in terms of MNE performance based on industry 
sector, with the RMM only model performing best in wholesale and the RHQ model performing best in 
manufacturing.  
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Given these results, scholars should not assume a convergence of characteristics over time or 
homogeneous RMC configurations across regions and industry sectors. While some overarching 
commonalities may exist, and persist, several unique characteristics may influence the relationship 
between strategy, structure, and performance (Mudambi, 2011; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Wolf & 
Egelhoff, 2002). For example, an RMM regional model may increase the likelihood of joint ventures and 
alliances across the region, due to the RMM’s industry expertise and embeddedness in business networks. 
On the other hand, an RHQ model may increase the likelihood of wholly-owned and globally integrated 
subsidiaries. Hence, we suggest that international business researchers include the type of regional 
governance model in their research design, while examining strategy-structure-performance relationships. 
On a related note, we also underscore the need to account for variations in MNE foreign affiliates. 
RHQs, RMMs, and regular subsidiaries need to be separated in studies that investigate MNE strategy 
and/or performance. If these three affiliate types are not differentiated, particularly for empirical analyses, 
potential issues could arise. For example, studies investigating expatriate employee levels, location 
choices, location-specific performance, and asset or size based performance metrics could come to 
misleading conclusions depending on the type and prevalence of RMCs in the data sample.  
In addition to formally testing our propositions, our findings and analysis provide several avenues 
for future research. The first entails understanding and explaining the relative prevalence and evolution of 
diverse regional governance models. We find that RMMs outnumber RHQs by more than 2:1 on average, 
and the majority of Japanese MNEs (64%) adopt an RMM only model. This contrasts with prior research 
(e.g., Laserre, 1996; Alfoldi et al., 2012) which expects RHQs to be the dominant form of regional 
management organization.  We also note during the period 1999-2009, RMM numbers grew by about 
30%, while RHQs remained relatively stagnant. This trend is mirrored at the MNE level, with the RMM 
only model gaining over time, while the dual and RHQ only models show signs of decline and stagnation 
respectively. While prior research has briefly pointed to such phenomena, it has not made the distinction 
between RHQs and RMMs. Lehrer & Asakawa (1999) discussed the phenomenon of smaller and flexible 
specialized regional management units in Japanese MNEs increasing over time. Lasserre (1996) posited 
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that after regional subsidiaries gain maturity, the role of RHQs becomes administrative and marginal, 
until they finally “disappear”. What explains the relative prevalence and growth of RMM based 
governance models, which we find from our large, longitudinal study of Japanese MNEs? Is this simply a 
more efficient model in terms of cost, co-ordination, and information and knowledge processing? Is this 
generalizable across contexts (e.g., Japanese, U.S., European MNEs)? We call for focused primary data 
source based investigations to understand and explain this phenomenon better. 
On a related note, similarities and differences between European, US, and Japanese models of 
regional management is a second research topic that would benefit from more large-scale empirical 
investigations. Most research on the RMC phenomenon (like this one) are ethnocentric in terms of the 
MNEs studied and the few that span across different countries of MNE origin (e.g., Lehrer & Asakawa 
(1999)) are smaller scale qualitative studies. For instance, Lehrer and Asakawa (1999) found that while 
these US and Japanese MNEs started their regionalization efforts from different ends of the integration-
responsiveness spectrum i.e., multi-domestic (US) and global (Japanese), MNEs from both countries have 
gravitated to intermediate positions in the recent past. It would be particularly interesting to examine 
whether the use of RMMs is as prevalent within US MNEs as it is with Japanese MNEs, and whether 
balancing the need for integration with responsiveness through RMMs has led to convergence between 
the two models. 
A third avenue springs from identifying the demarcation of roles and functions between RHQs 
and RMMs. We find that RMMs have a significantly and substantially greater proportion of strategic 
motivations, relative to RHQs, such as R&D, product planning, and information and knowledge 
dissemination. However, prior case-study based literature (Alfoldi et al., 2012) suggests that strategic 
decision-making is one of the RHQ functions, which RMMs are unlikely to engage in. We note there may 
be a distinction between investment rationales, which we examine, versus actual roles and functions 
performed. Future research should probe deeper into understanding if there is a disaggregation of co-
ordination and control functions (Benito et al., 2011) and entrepreneurial and knowledge-based processes 
(Hoenen et al., 2014) between RHQs and RMMs respectively. 
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A fourth and related area of promise entails investigating how innovation specific roles and 
functions differ between RHQs and RMMs. A key challenge for MNEs is tapping into and managing 
innovation that is both globally dispersed and locally embedded (Lunnan & Zhao, 2014; Meyer, 
Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). RMCs may be well positioned to do so, given their embeddedness in global, 
local, and regional contexts (Hoenen et al., 2014). Our study finds that less than 20% of sample RMCs are 
established with an investment purpose of managing innovation. Despite not necessarily having an R&D 
mandate, RMCs may mediate innovation relays between HQ and regional subsidiaries (Asakawa & 
Lehrer, 2003). However, understanding and analysing the specific and distinct innovation focused 
interventions that RMMs and RHQs perform is an area which requires further research. For instance, 
RMMs being large operating subsidiaries with technical know-how may have a more hands-on role in 
fostering bottom-up innovation and implementing top-down innovation within the region. In contrast, 
RHQs may have a more administrative innovation management role involving collection, dissemination, 
and standardisation of R&D practices and procedures. 
Finally, this research provides a large (near-population) sample baseline of RMC characteristics 
and performance. We contribute to theory by providing a structural complement to regional strategy in the 
context of the I-R framework. However, our investigation is purposefully exploratory and our primary 
goal is to inform subsequent theory building and empirical research into MNE regional management 
strategy and structure, rather than to develop or test theory. We believe that a lot of commonly held views 
and assumptions regarding RMC characteristics (e.g., relative prevalence of different RMC 
configurations, distinctions with regards to roles and purposes of RHQs and RMMs) have become widely 
accepted through practitioner experience and detailed, albeit small sample size studies by academics 
without being backed by large scale empirical studies. Consequently, research in the area has moved on to 
a process view, bypassing the base-case view, which has never been firmly established. Primarily, our 
work seeks to address this gap.  
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Table 1 Affiliate-level and Parent-level sample profiles 
Year Affiliate-level  Parent-level Total MNEs 
      MNEs with RMMs  MNEs with RHQs  MNEs with RHQs and RMMs  
 RMM RHQ RMC RMM/ RHQ 
 MNE RMM RMM/ MNE 
 MNEs RHQ RHQ/ MNE 
 MNE RMM RHQ RMC/ MNE 
  
1990 66 36 102 1.8 
 
39 57 1.5 
 
28 31 1.1 
 
15 19 15 2.3 
 
82 
1991 100 41 141 2.4 
 
59 94 1.6 
 
31 35 1.1 
 
15 16 16 2.1 
 
105 
1992 119 46 165 2.6 
 
66 112 1.7 
 
30 40 1.3 
 
17 17 17 2.0 
 
113 
1993 148 49 197 3.0 
 
84 140 1.7 
 
32 39 1.2 
 
17 18 20 2.2 
 
133 
1994 159 54 213 2.9 
 
96 151 1.6 
 
33 44 1.3 
 
17 18 20 2.2 
 
146 
1995 176 52 228 3.4 
 
119 170 1.4 
 
32 46 1.4 
 
15 16 16 2.1 
 
166 
1996 206 75 281 2.7 
 
129 198 1.5 
 
46 65 1.4 
 
18 18 20 2.1 
 
193 
1997 224 82 306 2.7 
 
139 214 1.5 
 
53 73 1.4 
 
17 20 19 2.3 
 
209 
1998 227 93 320 2.4 
 
141 212 1.5 
 
58 83 1.4 
 
18 25 20 2.5 
 
217 
1999 248 101 349 2.5 
 
152 232 1.5 
 
60 85 1.4 
 
20 26 26 2.6 
 
232 
2000 255 100 355 2.6 
 
154 239 1.6 
 
63 89 1.4 
 
19 25 21 2.4 
 
236 
2001 253 112 365 2.3 
 
147 234 1.6 
 
65 97 1.5 
 
20 28 25 2.7 
 
232 
2002 267 106 373 2.5 
 
154 248 1.6 
 
58 87 1.5 
 
21 29 29 2.8 
 
233 
2003 280 118 398 2.4 
 
162 254 1.6 
 
56 89 1.6 
 
26 36 39 2.9 
 
244 
2004 284 128 412 2.2 
 
167 259 1.6 
 
52 91 1.8 
 
26 35 47 3.2 
 
245 
2005 299 122 421 2.5 
 
179 269 1.5 
 
55 86 1.6 
 
29 40 46 3.0 
 
263 
2006 298 110 408 2.7 
 
181 268 1.5 
 
53 79 1.5 
 
26 40 41 3.1 
 
260 
2007 314 121 435 2.6 
 
169 263 1.6 
 
53 79 1.5 
 
30 61 52 3.8 
 
252 
2008 316 112 428 2.8 
 
167 269 1.6 
 
55 78 1.4 
 
27 57 44 3.7 
 
249 
2009 328 106 434 3.1 
 
167 270 1.6 
 
53 77 1.5 
 
26 68 39 4.1 
 
246 
Totalabc (568) (311) (855)   
 
(337) 
   
(140) 
   
(45) 
    
(455)  
4567 1764 6331   
 
2671       966       217         3854 
a. Total unique RMMs, RHQs, RMCs, and unique MNEs for each configuration (in brackets). Total affiliate-year cases, and MNE-year cases (in italics). 
b. The sum of unique RMMs (568) + RHQs (311) totals 879, which is greater than the number of unique RMCs (855) by 24. The difference is due to 24 
sample RMCs which were initially RMMs, but were classified as RHQs later, or vice-versa. 
c. The sum of unique MNEs across the three categories (337+140+45) totals 522, which is greater than the number of unique MNEs with RMCs (455) by 
67. The difference is due to 67 sample MNEs which adopt more than one of the three RMC configurations over time. 
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Table 2 Triad Regions 
Year ASIA EUa NAb 
 RMM RHQ RMC Subc RMC/Sub RMM RHQ RMC Sub. RMC/Sub RMM RHQ RMC Sub. RMC/Sub 
1990 23 6 29 3616 0.80% 25 15 40 1368 2.92% 17 14 31 1969 1.57% 
1991 30 6 36 3956 0.91% 39 15 54 1529 3.53% 30 19 49 2118 2.31% 
1992 40 9 49 4226 1.16% 45 15 60 1629 3.68% 33 21 54 2194 2.46% 
1993 56 9 65 4558 1.43% 50 15 65 1739 3.74% 41 24 65 2220 2.93% 
1994 59 13 72 5039 1.43% 54 17 71 1782 3.98% 45 23 68 2288 2.97% 
1995 68 12 80 5618 1.42% 54 17 71 1764 4.02% 52 21 73 2229 3.28% 
1996 91 25 116 6395 1.81% 59 21 80 1835 4.36% 53 28 81 2286 3.54% 
1997 104 30 134 6872 1.95% 60 20 80 1835 4.36% 58 31 89 2276 3.91% 
1998 104 35 139 7125 1.95% 63 23 86 1823 4.72% 58 34 92 2232 4.12% 
1999 113 38 151 7272 2.08% 71 26 97 1794 5.41% 61 36 97 2168 4.47% 
2000 122 41 163 7282 2.24% 65 28 93 1729 5.38% 66 29 95 2098 4.53% 
2001 123 50 173 7452 2.32% 63 29 92 1806 5.09% 63 31 94 2092 4.49% 
2002 133 46 179 7333 2.44% 70 27 97 1759 5.51% 59 32 91 1971 4.62% 
2003 144 52 196 7520 2.61% 70 28 98 1679 5.84% 62 37 99 1876 5.28% 
2004 145 63 208 7676 2.71% 71 26 97 1642 5.91% 65 37 102 1771 5.76% 
2005 152 57 209 7747 2.70% 75 25 100 1578 6.34% 67 38 105 1734 6.06% 
2006 154 53 207 7846 2.64% 73 22 95 1516 6.27% 65 32 97 1667 5.82% 
2007 164 58 222 7921 2.80% 70 26 96 1449 6.63% 74 34 108 1635 6.61% 
2008 163 54 217 7869 2.76% 68 21 89 1438 6.19% 78 34 112 1631 6.87% 
2009 167 56 223 7925 2.81% 80 20 100 1410 7.09% 73 27 100 1537 6.51% 
                
a. EU: Europe 
b. NA: North America 
c. Sub: Regular Subsidiary 
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Table 3 Developed and developing economiesabcd  
Countries Subsidiary 
(% of total) 
RMM      
(% of total) 
RHQ       
(% of total) 
p-value 95% CI  
RMM- Sub.  
95% CI    
RHQ-Sub. 
Developed       
United States of America 16.9% 23.9% 32.9% *** (5.9%, 8.1%) (14.2%, 17.8%) 
Singapore 4.8% 13.1% 16.2% *** (7.7%, 8.9%) (10.4%, 12.4%) 




4.5% 11.3% 4.4% *** (6.2%, 7.4%) Not significant 
Germany 3.0% 7.1% 4.8% ** (3.6%, 4.6%) (0.1%, 2.6%) 
       
Developing       
China 17.0% 6.6% 13.2% *** (9.3%, 11.5%) (2.0%, 5.6%) 
Thailand 8.7% 6.3% 1.4% *** (1.5%, 3.2%) (6.0%, 8.6%) 
Malaysia 4.9% 1.3% 2.9% ** (3.0%, 4.2%) (1.0%, 3.6%) 
Indonesia 4.3% 1.5% 0.4% *** (2.2%, 3.4%) (3.0%, 4.9%) 
Brazil 1.7% 0.7% 0.7% ** (0.6%, 1.4%) (0.4%, 1.6%) 
       
Developed countries (1990) 69.9% 89.4% 97.3% *** (18.2%, 20.8%) (25.3, 29.5%) 
Developed countriesc (2009) 41.5% 73.7% 62.3% *** (30.8%, 33.7%) (18.5%, 23.1%) 
Developing countries (1990) 30.1% 10.6% 2.7% *** (18.2%, 20.8%) (25.3%, 29.5%) 
Developing countriesc (2009) 58.5% 24.3% 37.7% *** (30.8%, 33.7%) (18.5%, 23.1%) 
       
†p < 0.1  *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. The top 5 developing and developed countries in terms of RMCs are shown in the table. All country numbers are for 2009. 
b. The p-values represent significant differences between each of RHQ and RMM % relative to subsidiary %. 
c. For Hong Kong, the difference between RHQ and subsidiary proportion is not significant. 
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Table 4 Foreign investment purposesab 
 
†p < 0.1  *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. The original questionnaire allowed for multiple choices, so percentages in each purpose column will not add up to 100%. 
b. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between proportions. 
 
 
Table 5 Dominant industriesab 
Industries  Regular 
Subsidiary 
 RMM p-value 95% CI 
Wholesale 24.5% 42.8%  *** (17.0%, 19.6%) 
Manufacturing 53.0% 27.6% *** (24.0%, 26.9%) 
Transportation 4.2% 8.9% *** (4.1%, 5.2%) 
Services 7.1% 8.9% *** (1.5%, 2.6%) 
Retail 2.7% 4.3% *** (1.1%, 2.1%) 
Finance insurance and real estate 4.6% 5.0%  Not significant 
Construction 2.6% 3.5% *** (0.4%, 1.4%) 
Mining 0.3% 0.1% * (0.04%, 0.4%) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.6% 0.0% *** (0.4%, 0.8%) 
     
†p < 0.1 * p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001  
a. RHQs are excluded since the dataset does not categorize RHQs by industry sector. 
b. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between proportions.
Investment purposes RMM RHQ p-value 95% CI 
Market seeking     
Access to local market 80.9% 57.1% *** (20.6%, 27.1%) 
Follow customers and partners 13.8% 4.3% *** (6.9%, 12.1%) 
New business development 10.7% 3.7% *** (4.6%, 9.3%) 
Incentive from local government 4.7% 4.4%  Not significant 
Resource seeking     
Access to natural resources 5.5% 3.1% ** (0.7%, 4.2%) 
Offshoring 10.9% 0.7% *** (7.8%, 12.4%) 
Export to a third country 25.5% 6.0% *** (16.2%, 22.8%) 
Efficiency seeking     
Establishment of production network 24.5% 12.2% *** (8.4%, 14.9%) 
Establishment of distribution network 46.6% 23.1% *** (19.6%, 27.4%) 
Access to labour force 17.7% 6.2% *** (8.6%, 14.4%) 
Measures against trade friction      
Strategic asset seeking    (4.2%, 10.2%) 
Product planning and R&D 18.1% 10.9% *** (4.9%, 12.8%) 
Information collection and knowledge-seeking 56.0% 47.1% ***  
Capital seeking (Financial risk management) 






*** (11.8%, 16.6%) 
 Measures against trade friction 3.3% 3.6%  Not significant 
Not specified 3.7% 11.9% *** (6.5%, 9.9%) 
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Table 6 Affiliate level characteristicsa 
 RMM RHQ p-value 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Revenue (thousand USD) 181,115 272,178 * (18954, 163170) 0.11 
Number of employees 327 148 * (25.5, 330.6) 0.10 
Start date       
Pre-1980          24.4% 12.7% *** (5.6%, 17.8%)  
1980-1989a          33.1% 20.9% *** (6.7%, 17.5%)  
1990-1999         35.0% 47.4% *** (7.8%, 16.17%)  
Post 2000           7.4% 19.0% *** (6.4%, 16.8%)  
†p < 0.1   *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between means for revenue and number of employees and for difference 
between proportions for start date. 
 
 
Table 7 Ownership and controlab 
 RMM RHQ p-value  95% CIs Cohen’s d 
Ownership and Control       
Total number of parents 1.4 1.1 *** (0.26, 0.35) 0.40 
Number of Japanese 
parents 1.2 1.1 
*** (0.14, 0.21) 0.30 
Focal parent ownership  86.7% 96.3% *** (8.3%, 10.7%) 0.52 
Expatriate number 7.7 12.3 *** (3.8, 5.5) 0.37 
Expatriate percentage  13.0% 26.0% *** (12.0%, 14.1%) 0.78 
Ownership Modes       
  WOSa  76.3% 94.3% *** (15.8%, 20.3%) 0.48 
  Majority  7.7% 2.9% *** (3.4%, 6.2%) 0.34 
  Even  3.8% 1.2% *** (1.6%, 3.6%) 0.20 
  Minority 12.2% 1.6% *** (9.0%, 12.3%) 0.19 
      
†p < 0.1 *  p < 0.05  **  **p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. WOS: Wholly owned subsidiary 
b. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between proportions for all variables expressed in percentages and for 
difference between means for all other variables. 
 
 
Table 8 Affiliate-level performanceab 
 RMM RHQ p-value  Odds Ratio 95% CI Cohen’s d 
       
Gain 63.5% 63.2% Not significant 1.49 (1.03, 2.1) 0.82 
Breakeven  21.1% 24.6% * 1.60 (1.06, 2.4) 0.88 
Loss 15.4% 12.2% * Reference   
    Category   
†p < 0.1  *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001   
a. FIML Logistic regression with affiliate performance as the nominal dependent variable (Gain=2, Breakeven=1, Loss=0) 
b. 95% CI (confidence interval) listed for Odds Ratio.  
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Table 9 Parent level characteristicsabcd 




 MNEs with RHQs 















Revenue (’000 USD)  791,019 4,850,007    3,395,365 *** (3977, 4141) 0.93 (2518, 2961) 0.84 (1375, 1535) 0.29 
Number of employees    9,811      54,459    63,650 *** (43.4, 45.9) 0.86 (52.5, 55.1) 0.95 (7.9, 10.3) 0.12 
Assets (’000 USD) 599,592 3,629,978     2,780,512 *** (2966, 3095) 0.87 (2113, 2249) 1.06 (787, 912) 0.21 
R&D intensitya  1.9%          2.8% 3.5% *** (1.3%, 3.8%) 0.14 (2.2%, 5.6%) 0.27 (0.8%, 2.7%) 0.25 
Advertising intensityab 1.4%          1.6% 1.5% *** (0.1%, 0.3%) 0.19 (0.08%, 0.24%) 0.23 Not significant  
Deg. of internationalizationa 38.8%          43.9%      40.6% *** (5.3%, 6.3%) 0.54 (2.0%, 3.2%) 0.36 (3.0%, 4.0%) 0.55 
 †p < 0.1  *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. FIML regression for R&D intensity, advertising intensity and degree of internationalization 
b. For advertising intensity, the difference between MNEs with RHQs and MNEs with RHQs and RMMs is not significant 
c. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between means for all variables.  
d. 95% CI listed in millions of USD for revenue and assets and in thousands for employees. 
 
 








RHQs & RMMs 
(C) 












ROA  2.8% 3.5% 3.1% *** (0.5%, 0.8%) 0.14 (0.2%, 0.4%) 0.07 (0.3%, 0.5%) 0.08 
ROS  3.0% 4.0% 3.4% *** (0.8%, 1.1%) 0.14 (0.2%, 0.5%) 0.05 (0.4%, 0.7%) 0.11 
           †p < 0.1  *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between means for all variables. 
 
 







MNEs with RHQs 















ROA  2.6% 1.3% 1.4% * (1.2%, 1.4%) 0.56 (1.03%, 1.28%) 0.48 (0.05%, 0.25%) 0.08 
ROS  1.3% 0.6% 1.0% *** (0.6%, 0.7%) 0.40 (0.26%, 0.42%) 0.19 (0.25%, 0.38%) 0.27 
           †p < 0.1  *p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001 
a. 95% CI (confidence intervals) listed for difference between means for all variables.  
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Table 12 Summary of differences between RMMs and RHQs  
 RMM RHQ 
Investment purposes  
 
 






Access to local market 
Information processing 
Financial risk management 
 




Dominant regions and              
countries  
Europe and North America 
United States, Singapore, Hong Kong 
United Kingdom, Germany 
Europe and North America 
United States, Singapore, China,  






Most RMMs established 1980-1989 
Higher Revenue 
Fewer Employees 
Most RHQs established 1990-1999 
 
 
Ownership and control 
 
 
Lower focal parent equity ownership 
Larger number of parents 
Lower expatriate percentage 
Lower percentage WOS 
 
Higher focal parent equity ownership 
Smaller number of parents 
Higher expatriate percentage 




High percentage of profitable units 
Lower percentage of break-even units 
Higher percentage of unprofitable units 
High percentage of profitable units 
Higher percentage of break-even units 
Lower percentage of unprofitable units 
 
 MNEs with RMMs MNEs with RHQs 
 




Lower total assets 
More employees 
Higher revenue  
Higher total assets 
 
 
Parent firm capabilities 
 
 
Lower R&D intensity 
Lower Advertising intensity 
 
 
Higher R&D intensity 
Higher Advertising intensity 
 
Parent degree of 
internationalization 
 





Lower ROA, Lower ROS 
 
Higher ROA, Higher ROS 
Higher ROA, Higher ROS 
 
Lower ROA, Lower ROS 
 
 
a. The dataset does not categorize RHQs by industry sector. 
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Figure 1 RMMs, RHQs, and RMM to RHQ ratio: 1990-2009 
 
Note: Primary Axis (on left) corresponds to numbers of RMMs and RHQs. Secondary Axis (on right) 
corresponds to RMM to RHQ ratio. 
 
Figure 2 RMC numbers in Triad regions: 1990-2009 
 
 
Figure 3 RMCs as a percentage of regular subsidiaries in Triad regions: 1990-2009 
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Figure 4 RMC Primary Parent Equity% and Expatriate%: 1990-2009 
 
Note: Primary Axis (on left) corresponds to Primary Parent Equity%. Secondary Axis (on right) 
corresponds to Expatriate% (expatriates as a percentage of total RMC employees). 
 
Figure 5 MNEs with different RMC configurations: 1990-2009 
 
 
Figure 6 RMC to MNE ratio for MNEs with different RMC configurations: 1990-2009 
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Figure 7 Extended Integration-Responsiveness Framework with Regional Structure-Strategy 
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APPENDIX I 
Prior empirical RMC studies in chronological order 
   
Authors Approach Major Arguments 
   
Parks, 1969 Interviews RHQs are not effective for U.S. MNEs in Europe because of poor profits, 
management, communication, and cultural differences. Guidelines are provided for 
effective RHQ strategy. 
Stopford & Wells, 
1972 
Survey MNEs with a high percentage of foreign sales adopt geographical area 
configurations, but global product divisions are still popular when product diversity 
is high. High percentage of foreign sales and high product diversity predict a matrix 
structure. 
Heenan, 1979 Survey Both American and Japanese executives demonstrate preferences for supportive 
services, communications and proximity to major country markets. 
Egelhoff, 1988 Secondary data Test of Stopford-Wells’ model. Product diversity leads to product divisions, but 
foreign sales does not discriminate between area and product divisions. However, 
foreign manufacturing leads to area divisions to improve regional coordination. 
Sullivan, 1992 Survey and 
interviews 
Investigated how European RHQs of U.S. MNEs manage the tension between global 
standardization and local responsiveness. Found that RHQs do so by mediating 
between the formal structure and informal (behavioral) sub-structure. 
Schütte, 1995 Case study Henkel Asia Pacific RHQ was established to “participate in the region’s growth” and 
aimed to strengthen Henkel’s position in the region. 
Lasserre, 1996  
 
Informal     
interviews 
RHQs play different roles as “initiators”, “facilitators”, “coordinators”, and 
“administrators” at different stages of MNE internationalization. 
Schütte, 1997  
 
Secondary data Many European MNEs started to expand to Asia in the 1990s through the 
establishment of RHQs, which needed to be justified by the MNE developmental 
stage, the objectives, the scope of operations, and the regional commitment. 
Lehrer & 
Asakawa, 1999  
Interviews Strategic importance of the region does not equal an enhanced role for RHQs. 
American and Japanese MNCs are “unbundling” their European operations to 
enhance flexibility. 
Schlie & Yip, 2000 Survey, interviews, 
archival data  
Regional strategies emerge at later stages in the evolution of an MNE’s global 
strategy. RHQs are seen as a means to balance integration and responsiveness. 
Yeung, Poon & 
Perry, 2001  
Survey and 
interviews 
Geographical distance, strategic necessity, and the availability of business services 
influence MNEs’ decisions to establish RHQs in Singapore. 
Wolf & Egelhoff, 
2002 
Secondary data Re-tested Egelhoff’s (1988) model, and extended it for matrix structures. Results 
suggest that a region-product matrix is more likely with high product diversity, and a 
region-functional matrix is more likely for higher levels of foreign manufacturing. 
Asakawa & 
Lehrer, 2003 
Case study Regional offices play an important role in mobilizing MNE knowledge globally, 
especially in the case of the “local-for-global” pattern.  
Paik & Sohn, 2004 Case study RHQs in several large Japanese MNEs are finding it difficult to achieve global 
integration and local responsiveness. Study examines effectiveness of a double-tiered 
RHQ scheme (at corporate group and individual business unit level). 
Enright, 2005 (a)  
 
Survey RHQs, regional offices, and local offices play distinctive roles in MNE strategies. 
The headquarters-subsidiary paradigm needs to be extended to include different 
organizational forms. 
Enright, 2005 (b) Survey Firm-specific and location-specific factors influence the roles a regional centre plays. 
They also provide guidelines for managers of regional management centres. 
Ambos, 
Schlegelmilch, 




Evolutionary perspective on regional management. Over time, driven by the need for 
legitimacy and influence, an acquired bank head office in Central and Eastern Europe 
strengthened its capabilities and transformed its role from regional governance and 




Case studies Regionalization strategy helps large MNEs deal with complexity and diversity, and 
RHQs are used to achieve superior performance. MNEs define regions based on 
activities, industries, and their development stage. 
Li, Yu & Seetoo, 
2010  
Case study Sub-regional HQs are established in response to integration-responsiveness forces. 
Industry characteristics and firm-specific advantages (FSAs) affect the delegation of 
authority from a parent to RHQs and sub-regional HQs. 
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Piekkari, Nell & 
Ghauri, 2010 
Case study Matching regional management capabilities with information processing 
requirements is a complex process of evolution and adaptation.  Changes occur at 
constituent regional elements, regional, and corporate levels to address the need for 
inter-region differentiation, and complexities at various levels.   
Benito, Lunnen & 
Tomassen, 2011 
Secondary data Greater degree of internationalization does not increase RHQ numbers; rather it is 
related diversification which leads to increase in RHQ density. Larger firms have 
fewer RHQs. 
De La Torre, 
Esperanca & 
Martinez, 2011 
Survey Market integration forces such as competition and globalization drive structural 
efforts at regional coordination and formation of RHQs. Older and larger firms have 
more RHQs, but the number of regular subsidiaries is not a predictor of RHQ 
numbers. 
Nell, Ambos & 
Schlegelmilch, 
2011 
Case study Regional management structures may be difficult to implement, since several MNEs 
have trouble allocating decision-making authority to RHQs and grouping subsidiaries 
into regions. While RHQs may manage interdependencies within regions well, their 
presence cuts off the management of interdependencies between regions. 
Alfoldi et al., 2012 Case study and 
interviews  
Regional mandates for operating subsidiaries is a cost efficient and responsive 
alternative to more administratively focused RHQs, especially in smaller peripheral 
markets. However, there are risks of legitimacy and of CHQ being blindsided.  
Mahnke, Ambos, 
Nell & Hobdari, 
2012  
Survey RHQs’ influence on corporate strategy is positively related to their autonomy and 
signalling behaviour. In addition, the specific characteristics and extent of a RHQ 
mandate moderates this relationship. 
Edgington & 
Hayter, 2013 
Interviews Singapore is the dominant RHQ centre for Japanese firms operating in the Asian 
market. While several decision-making functions have been devolved to RHQ, R&D 
remains centralized and involves HQ engineers working with subsidiaries. 
Hoenen, Nell & 
Ambos, 2014 
Survey RHQs by being embedded across local, regional, and global markets occupy an 
important intermediate position, since HQ is weakly embedded in local markets, 
while subsidiaries are strongly embedded locally, but less so regionally and globally. 
Kähäri, 2014 Survey and 
interviews 
RHQs are inherently dynamic and sensitive to change because they are embedded in 
local, regional, and global environments. Their role, location, and geographic scope 
are interdependent, and change in one attribute will affect other attributes. 
Lunnan & Zhao, 
2014 
Case study An RHQ facilitates MNE knowledge transfer through its management, structure, and 
position within the subsidiary network. 
Zhou, 2015 Secondary data Frontline subsidiaries in countries with weaker institutions are more likely to be 
supervised by foreign rather than domestic supervisory units. Foreign supervision is 
even more likely when subsidiaries in weak-institution countries conduct activities 
that are more central to or interdependent with their parents’ global operations.  
 
ENDNOTES 
i Our literature search covered the following journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management 
Review, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Administrative Science Quarterly, European Journal of Management, 
International Marketing Review, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of International Management, 
Journal of Management Studies, Journal of World Business, Long Range Planning, Management International 
Review, Organization Science, Strategic Management Journal, and Urban Studies. 
ii Since the distribution of the number of employees is highly skewed to the left with a long tail to the right, a 
logarithmic transformation was performed on the data to meet the normality assumption and improve 
interpretability. 
iii For highly skewed variables, a natural logarithm transformation was carried out to get a normalized distribution. At 
the parent MNE-level, we used the logarithm of operating revenue, number of employees, total assets, R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, and degree of internationalization; at the foreign affiliate-level, we used the logarithm of 
operating revenue, and number of employees.  
                                                             
